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President-E. W. GOODALL, O.B.E., M.D. [March 4, 1936] The History of Psychology in Medicine By MILLAIS CULPIN, M.D., F.R.C.S. MEDICINE, with its ancillary sciences, is commonly taught without more than casual references to history. This is regrettable, and clinical psychology can neither be taught nor understood without the knowledge of how current beliefs and, it may be added, disbeliefs, fit into a perspective that stretches backwards as far as the history of medicine itself. Even such common words as neurosis and neurasthenia enshrine conceptions that can be rightly valued only when put in their historical setting.
There exist to-day two fundamentally different ways of viewing some problems of clinical medicine, ways that are not dependent upon knowledge or clinical experience but upon an outlook that in turn depends partly upon traininqg and, to some extent perhaps, upon the temperament of the individual. This phenomenon is not new and if we hear expressed such an opinion as " everything depends upon the neurone" we know that in this simple statement the speaker indicates his attitude towards a basic difference of outlook which, expressed under names that varied with the period, has rarely been absent during the whole history of medicine.
Throughout the ages there has persisted, in various forms, the conception of some unifying principle which shall give reality to the body, manifesting itself in bodily functioning and activity, in emotion and thought. Such a principle was the physis of Hippocrates (still surviving in the word physiology), the anima of the classics, and the glan vital of Bergson. With this conception, and often opposed to it, has existed a craving, which found expression in Galen's doctrine of temperaments, that accounted for psychological states in terms of physiological mechanism. Thia doctrine dominated medicine for centuries, and then each discovery of science was in turn hailed as revealing a primary mechanism that should make the vital principle no longer a necessity, or should, at any rate, give it a material foundation. Fermentation was the primary mechanism of the Archaeus of van Helmont; the vital spirits of Sylvius were produced in the brain by the newly found process of distillation; Harvey's discovery gave Stahl the opportunity of showing his orthodoxy by tracing the temperaments to the nature of the blood-flow; and Haller's demonstration of the irritability of nerve gave rise to the nervous force that still lurks in the background of the conceptions of to-day.
In contrast to these strivings for mechanical explanations, the efforts of the philosophers of the pre-scientific era, from Aristotle through Plotinus, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, had been directed to understanding the same problems that concern the psychologist of to-day; one is able to see in Aristotle, for example, something approaching the hormic psychology of MacDougall. For an outline of this period we can turn to the paper by Major Greenwood and May Smith, on "Some Pioneers of Medical Psychology," in which they bring the story up to Ambroise Pare, van Helmont and Stahl [1] .
THE PART PLAYED BY STAHL AND HALLER
In the polemics of Stalhl (circa 1700) the conflict of views found full expression.
There were scientific giants in those days, and Stahl lived in an age that was reaping the cumulative effect of the work of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Harvey and. Descartes, and experiencing the activities of Boyle, Borelli, Newton and Sylvius.
OCT.-HIST. OF MED. 1
34
The time was ripe for a pitched battle between animism or vitalism on the one side aind iatro-physics or iatro-chemistry on the other, and it was fought between Stahl and Leibnitz. It is to be noted that Stahl taught anatomy and chemistry, but he maintained that they were given too much to carry and that some other principle must be invoked to account for the behaviour of man himself. Stahl possessed an understanding of human nature, and his studies of temperamental types showed an application of clinical methods that, greatly to the disadvantage of medicine, fell out of fashion till recent clinical psychology revived them. His descriptions will bear comparison with the modern work of Jung. To such a man iatro-chemistry and iatro-physics appeared woefully inadequate, and the authors cited above give a quotation from Stahl's Theoria Medical\ova which will show how, in those days, the basic difference of outlook influenced clinical attitudes as it does to-day.
"It is froxm this habitual use of words improperly elmployed to express the facts and so rendering them less intelligible that we get the general formula 'weakness of the nervous system [debile genus nervosum].'" Stahl turned back to the classical conception and used animia as a symbol to stand for a group of inexplicable qualities. What the anima actually is, he knew not; it was certainly not the soul as understood by theologians, but he found it a necessary conception in order to subsume activities that he could not bring under the conceptions afforded by his studies of anatomy and chemistry. Greenw,ood and Smith note that Stahl realized:-" 1.. The essential unity of the organism, in this linking hillmself with the greatest of the A-ncients. "2. The personal element in liability to disease. "3. The part played by mental conditions in causing milental and also physical disease. " 4. That the emotional life ought not to be overlooked in treating patients and that it is independent of reason." They note too that:
"About 200 years were to elapse before anyone could give practical effect to such observations, and by that time he was forgotten, except as the author of a discredited hypothesis in chemistry and a tseless brand of animism." Stahl was for two centuries "the last of the animists." That does not mean that psychology was permanently expelled from medicine; with whatever weapon it is driven out, tanzen usque recurret-it will keep coming back.
Albrecht von Hlaller followed soon after Stahl and, by close and accurate work, established the existence of the irritability of nerve. Sprengel, the historian, writing in 1803, at a time when the mechanistic views of the French encyclopaedists seem to have prevailed, was enthusiastic about the finite results of Haller's work [2] . He wrote:-" All the phenomena of life, especially the movements of the solids and the mnixture of the humours, are the results of the influence of the nervous force. ... ' 1 The nervous fluid that Haller reasonably supposed to flow along the nerve had become a nervous force, a force, however, no more demonstrable than the anima of Stahl.
Sprengel states that "Haller built up a theory of temperaments in terms of irritability," but Haller was, with one exception, thoroughly scientific in his refusal 1 Seelig, the American historian, writing in 1925, is more einthuisiastic than Sprengel oIn the same siibject, declaring that " these studies substituted for the old Hippocratic principle of the 'pneuma,' for the ' Archaeus' of Paracelsus, for the 'vital spirits' of Sylvius, and for the 'anima' of Stahl, for all these vague meaniigless' things these studies of Haller substituted the simple principle of irritability, a force now recognized and experimentally demenstrable in all living tissue. . . We may well picture to oturselves the significance of the eiuniiciation and proof of such a far-reaching fact." Seelig, G., Medicine, an Historical Outline, Baltimore, 1925, p. 139. This enthusiasm,calls for an explanation, and I suiggest that it can be found in the fact that this history of medicine, carried on up to the year of publication, did not contain a mentinii of psychology, not even a refuitation of Freud. Irritability of nerve had put all suich nonsense out of court.
to tolerate anything but the results of experiments and their legitimate deductions. The exception is his reference to temperaments, which occupies 26 lines in a total of 566 pages [3] . This lapse was perhaps a passing tribute to orthodoxy," like Descartes' location of the soul in the pineal gland. Haller must be acquitted of responsibility for the extravagant claims made for his work by Sprengel a'nd Seelig.
Nevertheless, upon the eighteenth-century knowledge of nerve' were constructed those conceptions expressed in the terminology that still flourishes in the words neurosis, neurasthenia, nervous exhaustion and the like. The nervous temp'erariment was a conception of Cabanis (circa 1800) who made it the opposite'of 'the muscular temperament, which has now disappeared.
THE CONCEPTION OF NEUROSIS
The word neurosis has a strange history. Cullen, the Edinburgh physician, wvrote (1780) "I propose to comprehend under the title of neuroses all those preternatural affections of sense or miotion which are without pyrexia, as a part of the primary disease" [4] .
Among his neuroses were apoplexy and palsy, syncope, dyspepsia, hypochondriasis, tetanus, epilepsy, chorea, palpitation, dyspncea, asthma, whooping-cough, pyrosis, colic, cholera, diarrhbea, diabetes, hysteria, hydrophobia. Whether this was the first use of the word neurosis I know not, but I see no objection to this manner of its use.
In 1874 Maudsley introduced a fresh use; he wrote of " insanity, epilepsy and some allied neuroses," and equated neurosis spasmodica with the insane temperament [5]. This we may perhaps trace to the influence of Huxley and his fellows who, like most of us, were obliged to assume that every mental'activity must be related to a neural activity; to the first was given the name psychosis, to the second neurosis. Maudsley was accordingly understandable when, speaking of things pathological, he chose to use neurosis to express a hypothetical altered . nerve function corresponding to and co-existing with a psychosis or altered mental function. The current use of these vords to express two different kinds of altered mental function is confusing and indefensible (e.g. we speak of the manic-depressive psychosis but the obsessional neutrosis). How this arose I do not know, but the origin of 'one specific usage can be traced. In 1895 appeared a paper by Freud on " The justification of separating from neurasthenia a definite symptom-complex as Angstneurose" [6] . This anxiety neuarosis was described by him as a physiological disorder, arising from physical sexual causes and inaccessible to psychotherapy. What the phrase means now I cannot say, but it is becoming very popular and its original application is already lost.
REVIVALS OF PSEUDO-PATHOLOGY
Returning to eighteenth century events, we find Cheyne writing (1733) about the "English Disease "-a prevalent disorder arising from luxury and such-like, " with atrocious and frightful symptoms," and obviously what we now call psychoneurotic (a word I do not defend, though I have to use it). Whytt, in 1764, under" Diseases commonly called nervous " described cases otherwise named "flatulent, spasmodic, hypochondriac, or hysteric." Thus, in spite of the common idea of the "modern plague of nerves" conditions were not very different from to-day. There was abundance of psychological clinical material and, together with mechanical explanations of the problems of life then in favour, this made the may ready for Mesmer's descent upon Paris in 1778. (Bodily magnetism, by the way, was not his invention, for William Maxwell had written a treatise De medicina magnetica in 16891. He took the conception and applied it to his own methods.)
The story of Mesmer need not be repeated, except to note his enormous initial popularity and to emphasize that he actually produced phenomena for whi'ch the easy explanation of fraud and humbug should not have sufficed. The official condemnation of his treatment and theories, by removing them from the only universe of discourse that was then recognized, arrested inquiry that might have been fertile. But animal magnetism remained alive in obscure corners and in the early nineteenth century became popular once more. Induced somnambulisms-a genuine phenomenon-were earnestly studied but, unfortunately, the subject became entangled with clairvoyance, " odylic" and " odic " force and other manifestations of credulity: In "Animal Magnetism " (1856), an extraordinary collection of "Wonders is described by Dr. William Gregory, a Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh, and the Lancet of the fifties contains vigorous and justifiable attacks upon the practices associated with the names of hypnotism and bodily magnetism. Honest workers like Elliotson, Esdaile and Braid, who studied hypnotism and are said to have used it successfully for surgical operations, fell under condemnation because of these associations. It was a dark period for the psychology that would not keep out of medicine.
In the late seventies came the extraordinary episode associated with Charcot and the Salp6tri6re. Charcot, whose standing as a neurologist cannot be disputed, set out to examine these phenomena by the same methods that he had found so useful in the investigation of nervous disease. His irreproachable scientific method was to study changes in the state of muscles, in reflex movements, and the degree of various sorts of sensitivity; this, he declared, excluded the possibility of fraud, which had invalidated the old experiments upon somnambulists. The results of this approach now appear scarcely credible. Burq's experiments upon metallotherapy, including, among other grotesqueries, the transference of symptoms from one side of the body to the other and the removal of organic anaestbesia by metallic contacts, were approved by Charcot, and the three stages of grande hyst&rie were described in detail as a specific disease. Pierre Janet gives an interesting story pointing to the conclusion that the first patients to reach Charcot's clinic and present these three stages had already been trained by the spiritual descendants of Mesmer; these stages had been described by the animal magnetists and Janet believes that Charcot accepted them ready made. He gives a long list of the many authors who contributed to the flood of literature that accompanied this revival, among which, I am glad to say, I find no English names [7] . Indeed, the Lancet of 1882 contains five vigorous articles from a Paris correspondent identifying Charcot's methods with those of the animal magnetists. We were, however, as you will soon see, busy at that time with our own artefacts.
Charcot's confutation came from Bernheim of Nancy, who declared that the former's varied syndromes had no existence before they were produced by the physician. This view led, of course, to vigorous controversy, but Bernheim finally prevailed and the bubble was pricked. One interesting survival, however, carried on till our time; students were taught that hysterical anesthesia existed witbout the patient knowing it until it was discovered by the examiner. Only during the Great War did it become common knowledge that hysterical anaesthesia could be produced or not at the will of the examining physician, though this had been established by Babinski in 1906.
Whilst Charcot and Bernheim were carrying on their arguments, an identical controversy was being waged in this country, the significance of which is overlooked.
Railway accidents had produced a new and terrible disorder called "railway spine."
This was no trivial condition, and Erichsen, who described and named it, gives a lengthy account of its manifestations and pathology in bis " Science and Art of Surgery," his pathology being accepted by the physicians and surgeons of the day. Railway spine rivals Cbarcot's grande hyst6rie and offers more painful reading. Even among shell-shocked soldiers, such wrecks were rarely seen as those associated with the theories of meningeal irritation, of ascending or descending degeneration, of meningo-myelitis, that accounted for and encouraged their development. Here is an extract from one case account. The man could walk only sideways and-"There was an extreme degree of sensibility of the skin of the back . . . on touching the skin lightly or on drawing the finger down it, the patient started forward as if be had beeni touched with a red-hot iron . . . the muscles were thrown into violent contraction so as to become rigid and to be raised in strong relief, their outlines becoming clearly defined" [8] .
This reaction was ascribed to concussion of the spine with chronic meningitis, and is of the same nature and described in almost the same words as those muscular contractions produced by Charcot with his various stimuli.
One can recognize occasionally in Erichsen's accounts the actual symptoms underlying the artefacts. One boy " became a coward," and would not stay alone in a room; a young woman could walk along a street until she came to an open space and then she fell down. We can recognize here a claustroand an agorophobia; the agorophobia was ascribed to spinal injury, but we are left guessing why the unfortunate patient had performed upon her the operation of excision of the clitoris. Somebody must have whispered the word " hysteria."
Among the impairments of vision caused by spinal injury were amblyopia-a " paresis of the optic nerve or retina "and irritability of the eye and photopsia from hyperasmia or inflammation of the optic nerve and retina; all fantasy, and none the less fantasy because couched in scientific language and supported by dissertations upon the physiology of the nervous system. Furneaux Jordan and Herbert Page opposed this mythopathology and destroyed it after a long and acrimonious controversy. But medicine had not yet recovered from the defeat of Stahl a century and a half earlier, and railway spine was replaced by that prostitution of scientific terminology, traumatic neurasthenia.
Then, when the Great War came, disorders belonging to the psychological sphere again thrust themselves upon medicine, and the age-long difference of outlook came once more into prominence. Shell-sbock appeared at first as an entirely new phenomenon; men were given wound stripes (i.e. decorations) for unrecognized hysterical conditions which were attributed to the physical effect of high explosives, and the literature of the period shows that fantasy again ran loose, this time in theories of punctiform hamorrhages, separated synapses, and dissociated cerebral centres. On the other hand there was a small group of workers who had already interested themselves in the psychoneuLroses and were able to recognize the nature of the phenomena of shell-shock, and there were otbers-perhaps, like Stahl, vitalists by temperament-who merely felt their inability to find an understanding of them in terms of anatomy, physiology and pathology.
DEVELOPMENT OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
We were, without knowing it, entering upon an important phase. In this historical series, from Mesmer onwards, we see explanations in physical terms always forthcoming and, for a time, accepted. Animal magnetism, the influence of metals, spinal disease and brain lesions, all served for a time and then were cast aside. Only in the last example, that of shell-sbock, was the discarding of physical hypotheses followed by an understanding of the phenomena through the use of conceptions belonging to the sphere of psychology. (This is perhaps unjust to Bernheim, but his views about suggestion were incomplete and soon forgotten.) Something had happened; to see what had happened we. must' retrace our steps.
Whilst the progress of orthodox medicine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was interrupted by the episodes I have described, philosophic psychology, during that period divorced from medicine, paid no attention to such manifestations. I think it had little to offer. Psychology had wandered into the sterile fields of intellectualism, in which reigned the conception of reason as the mainspring of action and instinct as something sub-human.
Discussion had been active about the metaphysical problem of the relation of brain events and mental processes, and most of us probably have more or less of a disposition to one of several hypotheses which during this period provided material for controversy. (I refer to psycho-physical parallelism, automatism and such-like.) A definition of neurosis as " a change in the nerve cells of the brain prior to, and resulting in, psychic activity" [4] belongs to one of these hypotheses and expresses what may appeal to some of this audience, but it starts me on a train of thought that is almost obsessional in its feeling of bewilderment.
Perhaps the step that tended to bring psychology again into relation with medicine was the distinction, originated by Kant, between the three aspects of mind, cognition, affection, and conation-knowing, feeling, and striving. In conation was the idea of the seeking of a goal, the teleology so abhorrent to nineteenth century science, that led to MacDougall's theory of instincts, and in affection lay the study of the emotions and their physiological relationships.
The Lange-James theory of emotions (1884) appeared to be confirmed by the physiological work of Cannon, and William James was one of the first of the modern authorities to admit the occurrence of mental processes outside the sphere of consciousness [9] . Von Hartmann does not rank as an authority but in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious " (1868) he comes, by a process of abstract reasoning, close to the conception of the unconscious as formulated later by Freud on experimental grounds.
It was, however, from the stimulus of the Salp6tri6re experiments that a practical departure arose. The study of somnambulism led Janet towards his theory of dissociation of consciousness, which subsumed under one descriptive formula the manifold symptoms of hysteria and the manifestations of mediumism and waterdivining, and still appeals to some clinicians. Other forms of the minor psychoses he accounted for on a theory of molecular dissociation and lowering of psychological tension, which has now lost its appeal. As a clinical observer he stands unrivalled, but it is notable that in his own country he seems to have met with little honour; in the literature of the period French writers approached the minor psychoses of war ab initio as if Janet had never lived, and missed many aspects of the cases that would have been obvious to a reader of Raymond and Janet's book, "Les Obsessions et la Psychasth6nie." Babinski's teaching, that hysteria was nothing but suggestion, was reactionary.
The lack of dynamic quality in Janet's theories cau sedthem to fade in the light of Freud's discoveries. Freud, already an organic neurologist of repute, used hypnotic therapy after a visit to the Salp6tri6re in 1885 when, presumably, metallotherapy had fallen into oblivion. Dissatisfied with the limitations of hyl)notism, he visited Bernheim at Nancy in 1889 and there gained the impression that behind the hysterical symptom lay powerful mental processes hidden from consciousness. By trial and error he developed the method of free association, which places in the hands of the investigator a means of access to such hidden processes, the manifestations of which had so misled clinicians approaching the subject from the mechanistic side. The method of free association is the fundamental principle in the practice of psychoanalysis; psycho-analytical theory has been devised in order to describe its results and generalize upon them. Apart from wider results, a pathology of the minor psychoses has at last been established, based upon observation.
We must note Freud's independence of the psychology of the schools. His autobiography describes his attack upon the clinical 'problem, unhelped -and unhindered by contact with the work of contemporary psychologists or the speculations of antiquity [10] . The general body of psychology was already approaching the clinical significance of the unconscious, but the discovery of the psycho-analytical technique was the one necessity without which practical advance was impossible. It is not to detract from Freud's credit as a pioneer if one speculates whether, as in most epochal advances in human knowledge, the time had not arrived when someone a little in advance of the rest was bound to make the step forward that mattered.
Independently of these developments there had grown up, associated with the names of Dubois and D6ijrine, a therapy that depended upon persuasion and exhortation combined with explanation. Also Morton Prince in America had made a study of cases described as dissociated personalities, a description that later on fitted many cases of shell-shock.
We can now understand why, when the phenomena of shell-shock appeared, the existence of these teachings gave new possibilities of handling them. After a preliminary skirmiish, theories of organic causes received quiet burial; then the urgency of the situation led to the establishment of centres where already qualified men could be trained in the handling of the patients in accordance with psychological principles. When these principles were applied, the war material provided easy demonstration of some of the mental processes described by Freud. Suppression and revival of memories, abreaction, as well as the symbolic expression of memories in the symptoms, could be studied by anyone who cared to make use of the material that was unfortunately so abundant [11] .
To a great extent, then, this work confirmed Freud's findings, though it really corresponded to the pre-analytical stage of his researches. The recentness of causative events favoured the induction of hypnoidal states for the recovery of memories, instead of the tedious process of psycho-analysis; yet, coming at a time when psycho-analysis was condemned root and branch, experience turned the attention of many workers to a serious consideration of the heresy.
THE PRESENT SITUATION
We are near enough to those days to remember that these views raised a storm of opposition as severe as that met by any other departure in fundamental theory. They have now permeated medicine to a degree that can be recognized only when a retrospective survey is made, and it is unlikely that the mass clinical errors of the period ending with the Great War will be repeated. The Conference that recently reported on the medical curriculum recogtnized the altered outlook by recommending the inclusion of psychology in the pre-clinical period, and specified " the unconscious " as one item in a suggested syllabus. On the clinical side we find in current literature ample evidence of the attention now paid to the influence of emotional states upon bodily changes.
A mode of thought that has persisted for two centuries cannot, however, lose its influence in a generation, and there still survives the sentiment that to postulate physiological processes and exclude or ignore psychological is to acquire merit in the eyes of the gods. History is repeated in the tendency to seize upon the latest discoveries as giving final solutions of what may be insoluble problems and, not long ago, endocrines served that purpose. In a book that seemed to be taken seriously we read:-"These glandular predomiinances are determining factors in the personality, creating genius and dullard, weakling and giant, Cavalier and Puritan. All human traits can be analysed in terms of these because they are expressed by them " L12]. In a film shown a few years ago to the Fellows of this Society, demonstrating the work of Pavlov, appeared the final caption: " Man's behaviour is but a series of conditioned reflexes." Mindful of the misuse that had been made of Haller's discovery of nerve irritability, I turned to Pavlov's own works, and, to my surprise, found that he believed in that sweeping statement himself, being, for example, credited with the opinion that " religion is the highest form of conditioned reflex." Tn an effort to understand this, I found the following passage:
"The dog [previously described as very tractable] was placed in a stand with loose loops round its legs, but so as to be quite comfortable and free to move a pace or two. Nothing more was done except to present the animal repeatedly with food, at intervals of some minutes. It stood quietly enough at first, and ate quite readily, but as time went on it became excited and struggled to get out of the stand, scratching at the floor, gnawing at the supports, and so on. This ceaseless muscular exertion was accompanied by breathlessness and continuous salivation, which persisted at every experiment during several weeks, the animal getting worse and worse until it was no longer fitted for our researches. For a long time we remained puzzled over the unusual behaviour of the animal. We tried out experimentally numerous possible interpretations, but though we had had long experience with a great number of dogs in our laboratories, we could not work out a satisfactory solution of this strange behaviour, until it occurred to us at last that it might be the expression of a special freedom reflex, and that the dog simply could not remain quiet when it was constrained in the stand " [13] . It is obvious that any behaviour, animal or human, can thus be made to fit this Procrustean bed. J. B. Watson, following these classical methods of forcible adaptation, propounded a behaviouristic psychology based upon conditioned reflexes -a " Hamlet " without the Prince of Denmark-which had a great vogue for a time in America. After reading Watson's books, whether as a duty or an amusement, we can understand MacDougall's criticisms, which are applicable to all mechanical theories when held forth as making psychological methods unnecessary. " These views simplify so greatly the problems that lie before the student of psychology: they abolish at one stroke many tough problems with which the greatest intellects have struggled with only very partial success for more than two thousand years; and they do this by the bold and simple expedient of inViting tbe student to shut his eyes to them, to turn resolutely away from them, and to forget that they exist " [14] .
The physiological work done on the conditioned reflexes has a bearing upon the theory of the unconscious and upon those curious mixtures of physical and psychical processes, the allergic disorders, asthma and such-like [15] , but the claim to find in the conditioned reflex a substitute for that approach which the clinical psychologist finds necessary can only be understood when placed in its historical setting. It appears that the modern justification of this and other claims rests upon the belief that science deals only with cause and effect, that any consideration of aim is unscientific and must be excluded. This may be a legacy from the days of the encyclopwdists, but it matured in the controversy between nineteenth century science and its theological opponents. Throughout the history of psychology, as is shown by Greenwood and Smith, there crops up again and again the question of how far theological considerations influenced the authors studied. Huxley had many a battle with the theologians, including a public argument with Gladstone about the story of the Gadarene swine, and the abhorrence of teleology that marked the writings of Huxley and Spencer arose from the need to make their position secure and their principles self-contained. To admit aim would have been to expose a joint in their armour. Pavlov, referring to contemporary vitalism, speaks of "the soul" as being unnecessary. Whether the word "soul" is a correct translation I know not, but its use links up the opposition to psychology with that against theology. This is a strange turn of fortune, but it is significant that the late Charles Mercier, described by MacDougall as an ardent disciple of Herbert Spencer, was the most vigorous opponent of psycho-analysis.
In bringing this survey to a close I must admit that many relevant matters have been omitted, but I trust that I have shown the need of the historical view for understanding the position to-day; moreover, that developments now taking place will have their own importance in the history of medicine.
